Eliminating Self-Reference from Grelling's and Zwicker's Paradoxes by Martínez Fernández, José & Valor Abad, Jordi
  
THEORIA 79 (2014): 85-97 
Eliminating Self-Reference from Grelling’s and Zwicker’s Paradoxes * 
José MARTÍNEZ FERNÁNDEZ and Jordi VALOR ABAD 
Received: 07.07.2012 
Final version: 03.01.2013 
BIBLID [0495-4548 (2014) 29: 79; pp. 85-97]           
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.6397 
ABSTRACT: The goal of this paper is to present Yabloesque versions of Grelling’s and Zwicker’s paradoxes concern-
ing the notions of “heterological” and “hypergame” respectively. We will offer counterparts of these para-
doxes that do not seem to involve self-reference or vicious circularity. 
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RESUMEN: El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer versiones de las paradojas de Grelling (sobre el predicado “hetero-
lógico”) y de Zwicker (sobre el hiperjuego) inspiradas en la paradoja de Yablo. Nuestras versiones de estas 
paradojas no parecen involucrar ni autorreferencia ni circularidad viciosa. 
Palabras clave: paradoja; autorreferencia; circularidad; Yablo. 
It is usually assumed that self-reference—be it in the form of strict self-reference (as 
in ‘this sentence is false’) or in the form of cross-references (as in ‘the following sen-
tence is true’, ‘the previous sentence is false’)—is an essential ingredient in the produc-
tion of semantic paradoxes. In 1993 Stephen Yablo challenged this widespread view 
by presenting an example of a set of paradoxical sentences that apparently does not 
involve any form of self-reference or even of circularity. Yablo’s paradox is presented 
as an infinite list of sentences sk, with k ranging over natural numbers, with the follow-
ing definitions:  
(s0) for all k > 0, sk is not true,  
(s1) for all k > 1, sk is not true,  
(s2) for all k > 2, sk is not true, etc.  
Suppose that, for some i, si is true. Then for all k > i, sk is not true. In particular, for all 
k > i +1, sk is not true, therefore si+1 is true, a contradiction. So we reject our initial as-
sumption and conclude that, for all i, si is not true. In particular, for all i > 0, si is not 
true, hence s0 is true and we have another contradiction. This shows that reasoning 
about the truth conditions of the sentences on the list generates a paradox even 
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though no circular cross-references are involved, since each sentence talks about the 
ones that follow it on the list, but not about itself or about the ones that precede it. 
 Since Yablo published his paradox, many philosophers have found paradoxes con-
cerning notions such as “truth”, “set” or “denotation” that do not seem to require any 
form of self-reference.1 This led some of them to defend the view that circularity is 
not essential in formulating semantic or set theoretic paradoxes. Moreover, it has been 
argued that by substituting infinity for self-reference in the so-called “paradoxes of 
self-reference” we can always obtain a paradox.2 This seems to raise two fundamental 
questions which are still in need of a fully satisfactory answer: (i) we want to know 
whether every paradox of self-reference or circularity has a “Yabloesque” counterpart; 
and (ii) we also want to know whether these paradoxes can really be excluded from 
the family of paradoxes of self-reference. While it remains unclear what the right an-
swer to the second question is,3 it seems more and more obvious that the answer to 
the first question should be affirmative. Any paradox of self-reference appears to have 
a counterpart involving some infinite series of expressions (denoting phrases, defini-
tions, sentences, etc.) which generate inconsistencies; and most of the notions that en-
able us to formulate paradoxes of the first kind can be used to devise paradoxes of the 
second kind. Our purpose here is to back up this thesis by giving two new examples 
of Yabloesque paradoxes that can be interpreted as counterparts of Grelling’s paradox 
and of Zwicker’s Hypergame paradox.4 
                                                      
1 See, for instance, non-self-referential versions of set-theoretic paradoxes in Goldstein (1994), of the 
paradox of the preface and the paradox of the knower in Sorensen (1998), of the Curry paradox in 
Beall (1999) and of paradoxes of denotation in Uzquiano (2004). 
2 Sorensen (1998) claims that all paradoxes of self-reference have non-self-referential counterparts. 
3 Priest (1997) argued for the thesis that Yablo’s paradox involves some kind of circularity. Sorensen 1998 
addressed Priest’s criticisms and argued for the non circularity of this and similar paradoxes. See also 
Beall (2001) (a reply to Sorensen in support of Priest’s main thesis), Bueno and Colyvan (2003) and 
Ketland (2004). It is not our intention to engage in this debate here. We will remain neutral as to 
whether these paradoxes involve some kind of circularity or not. 
4 In talking about ‘counterparts’, we do not mean to make a substantial claim. We just want to point out 
that these paradoxes are related to Grelling’s and Zwicker’s paradoxes in the same way as Yablo’s 
paradox is related to the Liar. Grelling’s and Zwicker’s paradoxes are, respectively, paradoxes of the 
concepts of satisfaction and game which clearly involve some form of vicious circularity—and this 
could be claimed of the Liar with respect to truth—and our paradoxes affect those very concepts in a 
prima facie non circular way—just as it happens with Yablo’s paradox and the concept of truth. 
  We could consider a strong sense of ‘counterpart’ according to which being a counterpart would 
involve being “the same” paradox. It is not clear to us that in this sense Yablo’s paradox is a counter-
part of the Liar paradox. Why should it be more a version of the simple Liar than, say, a version of 
the cyclical Liar (the following sentence is true/the previous sentence is false)? Are the simple Liar 
and the cyclical Liar the same paradox? To give criteria for the identity of paradoxes is a substantial 
problem that would involve an analysis of the structure of paradoxical arguments that, as far as we 
know, has not been undertaken yet. A first step into what is, we think, a promising direction are re-
cent works by Cook (2004) and Schlenker (2007a, 2007b) that show that self-reference can be elimi-
nated from certain non-quantificational languages in the following sense: we can systematically trans-
form each self-referential sentence into an infinite set of sentences in a quantificational language satis-
fying these two conditions: (a) they are not self-referential; and (b) they preserve the truth-value of the 
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1. Why Grelling’s and Zwicker’s paradoxes are paradoxes of self-reference 
Consider the predicate ‘heterological’ (Het, for short). According to its definition, we 
say that a predicate /P0 is heterological if and only if it is not true of its own name or, 
in other words, if and only if /P0 is not itself P.5 We could capture the truth conditions 
of a sentence in which /Het0 is applied to some predicate /P0 by means of the bicon-
ditional: Het(/P0) iff ¬P(/P0). Predicates like ‘long’ and ‘short’, for instance, are heter-
ological and not heterological respectively, for ‘long’ is not long, whereas ‘short’ is 
short. Grelling’s paradox arises when we consider the truth of Het(/Het0), that is, 
when we consider whether ‘heterological’ is itself heterological, for then we have that 
Het(/Het0) iff ¬Het(/Het0). This paradox can also be viewed as a paradox involving 
the semantic notion of satisfaction (Sat, for short), a relation which is meant to meet 
condition (1): 
(1) ∀y (Sat(y, /P(x)0) iff P(y)).6  
We can now define /Het(x)0 as the predicate satisfying the following condition:  
(2) ∀x (Het(x) iff ¬Sat(x, x))  
Let  h = /Het(x)0. From (1) and (2), it follows 
(3) ∀x (Sat(x, h) iff ¬Sat(x, x)) 
Grelling’s paradox arises when we consider the following instance of (3): Sat(h, h) iff 
¬Sat(h, h). 
 In 1908 Russell described as paradoxes of ‘self-reference’ or ‘reflexiveness’ a col-
lection of well known semantic and set-theoretic antinomies that, with some additions, 
are still labelled that way nowadays.7 Grelling’s paradox was included among them to-
gether with Russell’s paradox about the class of all classes not belonging to themselves 
and the liar paradox among others. The label ‘self-reference’, however, is rather puz-
zling in this case. Strictly speaking, there is no self-reference—i.e., no expression refer-
ring to itself or sentence talking about itself—involved in Grelling’s or Russell’s para-
doxes, for instance. This label should be understood in a broad or metaphorical way 
which is far from clear. The term ‘reflexiveness’—coined by Russell too—perhaps 
fares better in describing what is common to all these paradoxes. Many of them seem 
indeed to arise when we consider whether some object keeps a certain relation to it-
self: the fact that the liar sentence says about itself (and not about any other sentence) 
that it is not true is crucial in the inference of a contradiction; and considering whether 
the Russell class belongs to itself is what triggers Russell’s paradox. Likewise, the possibil-
ity of applying to itself the predicate ‘heterological’ is what renders it inconsistent. But 
                                                                                                                                         
original sentence. These results are important, but they are not directly applicable to paradoxes that 
involve the definition of predicates or games. 
5 Henceforth, we abbreviate ‘if and only if’ as ‘iff’. 
6 In this paper, we are only concerned with predicates, understood as open formulas with one free varia-
ble. Hence we restrict the satisfaction relation to those formulas.  
7 See Russell (1956, 61).  
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the label ‘reflexiveness’ (or ‘reflexivity’) still fails to single out a clear feature bringing 
all these paradoxes together.8 Russell made the analysis of reflexivity more precise 
when he pointed out a trait that all these paradoxes seem to share: they all involve 
some sort of vicious circularity. He characterizes the notion of vicious circularity by 
means of a negative principle: 
‘Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection’; or, conversely: ‘If, pro-
vided a certain collection had a total, it would have members only definable in terms of that total, 
then the said collection has no total.’ (Russell 1956, 63) 
In all these paradoxes, there is always some entity a and some collection Ω (sometimes 
a = Ω) such that a is a possible member of Ω, but one that can only be defined by ap-
pealing to all the members of Ω. This leads to a vicious circle in the definitions of Ω 
and a since we need all the elements of Ω in order to define a, but we need to deter-
mine (on the basis of a’s definition) whether a is an element of Ω in order to define Ω. 
In the case of Grelling’s paradox, for instance, given a language L that contains a 
predicate ‘Het’, we could identify Ω with the extension of ‘Het’, this is, with the totali-
ty of things that do not satisfy themselves; and a would then be the predicate ‘Het’. 
We have here a straightforward case of circularity according to the above description. 
We need all the elements of Ω (including all the predicates that do not satisfy them-
selves) in order to ensure that ‘Het’ is well defined and determines an extension. But 
‘Het’ itself is a possible member of Ω, so we need to determine (on the basis of the 
definition of ‘Het’) whether ‘Het’ belongs to Ω in order to ensure that Ω exists and is 
well defined.  
 Building upon previous works by Bertrand Russell,9 Graham Priest (1994, 2002) 
has advanced a structural description of the paradoxes of “self-reference”. He calls 
‘Inclosure Schema’10 the general description of the relevant elements present in all 
paradoxes of self-reference.11 The main elements of IS are a collection Ω, which con-
tains all things satisfying some property ϕ, and a function δ that maps all subsets x of 
Ω possessing a certain property ψ (also possessed by Ω) into elements of Ω in such a 
way that δ(x) always satisfies two conditions: δ(x) ∈ Ω (closure) and δ(x) ∉ x (transcend-
ence). A contradiction arises when we consider δ(Ω).12 The relationship between Ω and 
δ(Ω)—one of its elements according to the “closure” condition—reproduces exactly 
the kind of circularity banned by Russell, and described above in terms of the relation 
of mutual dependence between some collection Ω and a, one of its alleged elements 
                                                      
8 Some members of the so called paradoxes of ‘self-reference’ or ‘reflexiveness’—for instance, König’s 
paradox about ‘the least non-describable (or non-definable) ordinal number’—do not clearly involve 
an object that keeps a certain relation to itself.  
9 Specially, Russell (1905). 
10 IS henceforth. 
11 Those, at least, where the concept of negation has some role to play. V.gr., Curry’s paradox can only be 
viewed as an instance of IS if, for any proposition α, we define ‘¬α’ as ‘α → ⊥’, where ‘⊥’ stands for 
a necessarily false proposition.  
12 See Priest (2002, 133–36).  
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(which becomes δ(Ω) in IS). Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that if a paradox can 
be regarded as an instance of IS and its generation involves the presence of two cru-
cial structural elements that we can easily identify with Ω and δ(Ω) in IS, then the kind 
of vicious circularity described by Russell must play some role in the production of 
the paradox.  
 Priest shows that the predicate ‘heterological’ generates an instance of IS (with Ω 
as described above).13 Likewise, it can be shown that Zwicker’s paradox provides also 
an instance of IS. This paradox is formulated in terms of games: 
 Let us consider two-player games, like chess or tic-tac-toe. We will call the players I 
and II. A game is well-founded when every play of the game ends after finitely many 
moves, with no ties. If a game is not well-founded, some plays of the game could go 
on indefinitely, the result being then undecided. Let us now define a new game called 
the Supergame.14 It is a two-player game with the following rules: on the first move 
player I chooses a game, which we will call the subgame. Then player II starts playing 
the subgame and, from that moment on, player II of the Supergame becomes player I 
in the subgame and player I in the Supergame becomes player II in the subgame. The 
player who wins the subgame will be the winner of the Supergame. The Supergame is 
obviously not well-founded, since on the first move player I can choose a non-well-
founded game. The Hypergame is a variation of the Supergame that creates a paradox. 
The rules of the Hypergame are identical to the rules of the Supergame, except that on 
the first move player I must choose a well-founded game. It is easy to prove that the 
Hypergame is well-founded: on the first move I chooses a well-founded subgame, 
hence any play of the subgame is bound to end after a finite number of moves. How-
ever, since the Hypergame is well-founded, there can be plays in which I chooses the 
Hypergame as a subgame. Then II begins to play the Hypergame by choosing a new 
subgame, and II could choose the Hypergame again. They could choose the Hyper-
game forever, proving that the Hypergame is non-well-founded. Therefore the Hyper-
game is both well-founded and non-well-founded.  
 Zwicker’s paradox is an instance of IS. It involves a totality Ω, the set of well-
founded games, and a particular game δ(Ω), the Hypergame, defined in terms of the 
elements of Ω.15 Insofar as the heterological and hypergame paradoxes can be viewed 
as instances of IS, we can consider them as “paradoxes of self-reference” in this rather 
broad sense in which ‘self-reference’ actually alludes to the presence of some sort of 
vicious circularity not necessarily related to the notion of ‘reference’. In the next sec-
tion, we will offer a version of Grelling’s paradox that does not seem to involve circu-
larity of any kind; and in the last section, we will offer a Yabloesque counterpart of 
Zwicker’s paradox. 
 But before moving on, let us address a possible objection. We have used IS—as 
Priest and others do—as a criterion for determining when a paradox is a paradox of 
                                                      
13 See Priest (1994, 31–32; 2002, 145–46). 
14 For the Supergame and the Hypergame paradox we follow the presentation in Barwise and Moss 
(1996). See also Zwicker (1987). 
15 For details, see Valor Abad (2008, 197–98). 
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circularity. As a matter of fact, Priest argues that Yablo’s paradox is an “inclosure” (an 
instance of IS). Does that mean, after all, that Yablo’s paradox and perhaps other Ya-
bloesque paradoxes involve some form of circularity (or at least that we are claiming 
so)? Well, if it is true that Yablo’s paradox is an inclosure, then we have very good rea-
sons for thinking that it is a paradox of circularity, for Ω and δ(Ω) clearly violate Russell’s 
principle. But is Yablo’s paradox an inclosure? 
 When Priest casts this paradox into the mould of IS, he presents it as a paradox 
concerning the satisfaction relation, not the truth predicate. One of the reasons he 
gives is that, if we interpret the paradox as one involving the truth predicate, we can-
not make sense of the contradiction we reach from the sentences si in section 1. He 
expresses the paradox as follows (where ‘T’ stands for ‘true’): 
Tsn   ⇒   ∀k > n, ¬Tsk   (*) 
   ⇒   ¬Tsn+1  
But: 
Tsn   ⇒   ∀k > n, ¬Tsk  (*) 
  ⇒   ∀k > n+1, ¬Tsk 
  ⇒   Tsn+1    (**) 
Hence, Tsn entails a contradiction, so ¬Tsn. But n was arbitrary. Hence ∀k ¬Tsk, by Universal 
Generalization. In particular, then, ∀k >0, ¬Tsk, i.e., s0, and so Ts0. Contradiction (since we have 
already established ¬Ts0). (Priest 1997, 237) 
 According to Priest, for this proof to be valid, we should justify the lines marked 
with stars by appealing to the Tarskian Schema (TS). However, this is not possible be-
cause all lines where TS should be applied contain a free variable, ‘n’, and TS can only 
be applied to sentences, not to open formulas with free variables. The subscript nota-
tion in Yablo’s paradox obscures the fact that we need a function ‘s’ in order to build, 
for each number i, a name, si, of the ith Yablo sentence. This function “is defined by 
specifying each of its values, but each of these is defined with reference to s” because s 
appears in the sentences themselves (Priest 1997, 239). The idea is that we cannot un-
derstand this paradox without thinking of a function s whose values can only be de-
fined or specified by appealing to that very function in a circular (and not just recur-
sive) way. The crucial claim here is that we can only understand Yablo’s paradox if it 
involves a circular predicate s. If this claim were wrong, the identification of Yablo’s 
paradox with the inclosure described in Priest 1997 would be ungrounded. But Priest 
offers a powerful reason in favour of his thesis. He raises a legitimate worry: how do we 
know that the Yablo sequence exists? We can prove by an application of Gödel’s diagonal 
lemma the existence of a formula s(x), satisfying the general principle ∀x (s(x) ↔ ∀k > 
x, ¬Sat(k, /s(x)0)). The instances s(n) of this formula (for n a natural number) can now 
be interpreted as the Yablo sentences. This principle guarantees the existence of the 
Yablo sequence, but it forces us to express the sequence by means of a predicate 
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s(x).16 The contradiction would now be obtained by appealing to the Satisfaction 
Schema.17 
 If Priest is right in claiming that this suffices for showing that Yablo’s paradox is a 
paradox of circularity, then virtually every Yabloesque paradox is a paradox of circulari-
ty, for it seems impossible for us to word those paradoxes or think of them without 
appealing at some point to a functional expression that is circular in the way just de-
scribed by Priest. But Priest’s claim is controversial. Sorensen (1998, 144-46), for in-
stance, argues that the fact that we cannot find in language or in our thoughts non-
circular ways of representing the propositions expressed by the Yablo sentences does 
not mean that the propositional content of those sentences is circular. There could even 
be, for instance, a sequence of propositions that (i) originates a Yabloesque paradox, 
but (ii) cannot be expressed by means of a sequence of recursively specifiable sentenc-
es. Moreover, there is no agreement concerning how to understand the terms ‘self-
reference’ or ‘circularity’. Leitgeb has argued that in this debate two different notions 
of self-referentiality and circularity are being used: one of them is based on the intui-
tion that a sentence is self-referential when, roughly speaking, the sentence contains a 
term that refers to itself; and the second notion is based on the idea that a sentence is 
self-referential when it is obtained as a fixed point of a syntactic function (just as the 
Yablo sentences have been obtained). Yablo’s sequence is circular only in this second 
sense, not in the first. If these two notions could be made precise, we would have a 
way to make compatible both intuitions: the second sense would vindicate the          
                                                      
16 Strictly speaking, the satisfaction predicate is not essential. The predicate s required for the formulation 
of the paradox can also be expressed with the truth predicate, for both predicates are interdefinable. 
See Ketland (2004, 168; 2005). 
17 One might think that there is no need to resort to a circular predicate and to the satisfaction relation in 
order to prove that the Yablo sentences are inconsistent. The following reasoning offered by Bueno 
and Colyvan (2003) may suggest that it is possible to derive a contradiction from these sentences by 
appealing exclusively to TS: 
(1) If we substitute 0 for n in the reasoning advanced by Priest and suppose Ts0, we infer Ts1 and 
¬Ts1 justifying the starred lines by applications of TS on s0 and s1.  
(2) We then conclude ¬Ts0 by reductio, which means that ∃k > 0, Tsk.  
(3) Now, if we let u be some natural number satisfying the existential claim in (2), then, by 
substituting u for n in Priest’s reasoning, we infer another contradiction: Tsu+1 and ¬Ts u+1 and, 
again, we use TS. 
  Ketland, however, has shown that this reasoning is flawed (we thank an anonymous referee for 
calling our attention to this fact). If it were correct, it would prove that the Yablo sentences and their 
corresponding TS biconditionals are jointly inconsistent, but this is not the case. These sentences are 
indeed ω-inconsistent: if—as it happens in standard models—the only values taken by their variables 
are natural numbers, then we can draw a contradiction in the way just sketched. However, Jeffrey 
Ketland has proved that there are non-standard models of arithmetic where the Yablo sentences and 
their corresponding TS biconditionals are consistent. (For details, see Ketland 2005.) Steps (1) and (2) 
in the above reasoning are correct and show that ∃k > 0, Tsk, but, as Ketland (2004, 170) points out, 
“one cannot infer from this that an object which witnesses this existential statement is itself a standard 
number,” as we do in (3). And, if u is not a standard number, we can no longer infer Tsu+1 and ¬Tsu+1. 
Hence, Bueno and Colyvan’s attempt to prove the inconsistency of the Yablo sentences without ap-
pealing to the satisfaction relation and to a circular predicate fails. 
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intuition that we prove the existence of the series of sentences using an intuitively cir-
cular device, the first would vindicate the intuition that the Yablo sentences are such 
that they do not refer to themselves at all.18 These difficult issues go far beyond the 
scope of this paper and we will not take a stand on them here. 
2. A counterpart of Grelling’s paradox 
The present paradox arises in an interpreted first-order language L containing an     
infinite number of names: h0, h1, h2,… and two relational terms: ‘>’ and ‘Sat’. The in-
terpretation of the hi names is given by the following list of predicates, which we will 
call l : 
(h0) x > h0 → ∀y (y > x → ¬Sat(y, x))  
(h1) x > h1 → ∀y (y > x → ¬Sat(y, x))  
(h2) x > h2 → ∀y (y > x → ¬Sat(y, x))  
… 
 For simplicity, we take the domain of interpretation of L to consist only of the 
predicates of the list l. The relational term ‘>’ establishes an ordering among those 
predicates in such a way that, for every two natural numbers n and m, hn > hm iff n is 
greater than m.19 Finally, ‘Sat’ is the satisfaction relation: /Sat(x, y)0 is true iff x satisfies 
y. 
 As a consequence of the previous semantic stipulations, the satisfaction conditions 
of the predicates of l can be represented by means of the schema (Shi):  
(Shi)  ∀x (Sat(x, hi) iff (x > hi → ∀y (y > x → ¬Sat(y, x)))) 
(Shm)—the result of replacing ‘i’ with the natural number m in the former schema—
says that, for every predicate x in the list l, x satisfies the predicate hm if and only if one 
of the following three cases obtains:  
(i)  x is identical to hm;  
(ii)  x precedes hm in l (hm > x);  
(iii) x follows hm in l (x > hm) and no predicate following x in l satisfies x.  
We can show that the predicates of l give rise to a paradox. But, in order to do so, we 
first need to establish a lemma:  
(Lemma) For every x, y, z, if x > y and Sat(x, y), then Sat(x, z). 
This lemma says that, if any predicate x of l satisfies any other predicate preceding x in 
l, then it satisfies all predicates of l. It is easy to see that the lemma holds. Take any 
two predicates of l, hn and hm, such that hn > hm and assume that Sat(hn, hm). According 
to (Shn), Sat(hn, hm) is equivalent to hn > hm → ∀y (y > hn → ¬Sat(y, hn)). Given that hn > 
hm, we infer (I) by Modus Ponens:  
                                                      
18 Leitgeb argues that the task of giving a precise content to these notions of circularity faces very serious 
problems. More on this issue can be found in Urbaniak (2009). 
19 We will often use the expressions ‘x follows y in l’ and ‘y precedes x in l’ as equivalent to ‘x > y’. 
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(I)  ∀y (y > hn → ¬Sat(y, hn))  
 Next, we want to show that all predicates of l are satisfied by hn. In order to do so 
let us divide the predicates of l in two groups: (a) predicates preceding hn in l (at least 
hm is in this group); and (b) predicates not preceding hn in l (hn, hn+1, hn+2, and so on). 
Now, take an arbitrary predicate hr of l. Suppose it belongs to group (b): hr > hn or hr = 
hn. We know by (Shr) that hn satisfies hr iff:  
(II)  hn > hr → ∀y (y > hn → ¬Sat(y, hn)) 
 However, hn trivially satisfies this conditional, for it renders its antecedent false. 
Hence, hn satisfies hr. Suppose now that hr belongs to group (a): hn > hr. As we saw, hn 
satisfies hr iff (II) is the case. But, clearly, the antecedent of (II) is true and we have al-
ready proved the truth of its consequent, namely, (I). Therefore (II) is true and so is 
Sat(hn, hr). At this point, we have shown that if hn > hm and Sat(hn, hm), then Sat(hn, hr). 
Given that hm, hn and hr were arbitrary predicates of l, we can generalize the result and 
prove the lemma. 
 How do we get a paradox now?  
 Take any two predicates of l : hn and hm, such that hn > hm and suppose that Sat(hn, 
hm). By (Shm), this is equivalent to a conditional, hn > hm → ∀y (y > hn → ¬Sat(y, hn)), 
whose antecedent is true. We infer then (I*):  
(I*)  ∀y (y > hn → ¬Sat(y, hn)) 
 An instance of (I*) gives us ¬Sat(hn+1, hn), which is equivalent in classical logic to 
(II*) given (Shn): 
(II*)  hn+1 > hn ∧ ∃y (y > hn+1 ∧ Sat(y, hn+1)) 
 The second conjunct of (II*) says that hn+1 is satisfied by some predicate following it 
in l. Let us suppose that hr meets that condition: hr > hn+1 and Sat(hr, hn+1). We can 
prove now a contradiction. By applying our lemma on this assumption, we infer:  
Sat(hr, hn) 
However, from (I*) and the fact that hr > hn, we can also infer: 
¬Sat(hr, hn)  
 This contradiction offers a reductio ad absurdum of our initial assumption: Sat(hn, hm). 
Given that hn and hm were arbitrary predicates such that hn > hm, we have proved that 
there cannot be a pair of predicates x, y in l such that y > x and Sat(y, x) or, equivalent-
ly, that for every x, y in l, if y > x, then ¬Sat(y, x). Unfortunately, our present conclu-
sion also leads to a contradiction.  
 Take two predicates of l, hn and hm, such that hn > hm. Then we have ¬Sat(hn, hm), 
which, given (Shm), is equivalent in classical logic to: 
(II’)  hn > hm ∧ ∃y (y > hn ∧ Sat(y, hn)) 
 The second conjunct of (II’) says that there is some predicate y in l such that y > hn 
and Sat(y, hn). But this contradicts what we just showed, namely, that, for every x, y in l, 
if y > x, then ¬Sat(y, x). 
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 This proves that the satisfaction conditions of the predicates of l are paradoxical: 
whenever we consider, for any two predicates x, y of l such that x > y, whether x satis-
fies y, we reach a contradiction both, from Sat(x, y) and from ¬Sat(x, y).  
 Notice that there is an important difference between the predicates in l and the 
predicate h (heterological). Grelling’s paradox arises when we apply ‘heterological’ to 
itself—that is why it was considered a paradox of “self-reference” or “reflexivity”. 
Given the definitions of ‘heterological’ and ‘satisfaction’, we have that Sat(h, h) iff 
Het(h) iff ¬Sat(h, h). Applications of ‘heterological’ to predicates other than itself are 
not problematic at all. In the case of the predicates of l, on the contrary, all instances 
of the schema Sat(hi, hi) resulting from replacing ‘i’ with a natural number are straight-
forwardly true.20 The possibility of self-applying one of these predicates is not a source 
of paradox. Moreover, the problematic cases: those where we consider whether   
Sat(x, y) when x > y, do not seem to depend on the truth conditions of Sat(z, z) for 
any z of l. 
 A second thing to notice is that the paradox we have offered is different from 
(Priest’s version of) Yablo’s paradox. According to Priest and Ketland, the existence 
of the Yablo sentences –and their paradoxical status– can only be ensured because it is 
possible to prove the principle (Y): ∀x (s(x) ↔ ∀k (k > x → ¬Sat(k, /s(x)0)) by means 
of Gödel’s diagonal lemma. Each instance of (Y) (with ‘x’ ranging over the natural 
numbers) can then be identified with one of the Yablo sentences. This offers crucial 
evidence for the claim that Yablo’s paradox involves the satisfaction relation ‘Sat’ and 
a circular predicate ‘s(x)’. Here, we have described a Yabloesque paradox involving an 
infinite sequence of predicates and the notion of satisfaction. One might wonder 
whether Yablo’s paradox (under Priest’s description) is really different from ours, 
since they both seem to involve predicates and the satisfaction relation. That they are 
different can easily be seen when we proceed to justify the existence of l —our se-
quence of predicates—in the same way as Priest and Ketland proved the existence of 
the Yablo sentences. The diagonal lemma establishes the following general principle 
(where the variables range, as before, over natural numbers):  
(H)  ∀x, y (h(x, y) ↔ (y > x → ∀z (z > y → ¬Sat(<z, y>, /h(x, y)0)))). 
 We can then use (H) in order to define the predicates of l, just as we used (Y) in 
order to define the Yablo sentences. The sentence ‘s(n)’ corresponds to the nth Yablo 
sentence, and the formula ‘h(n, y)’ corresponds to the nth predicate of l: 
(Y*)  s(n) ↔ ∀k (k > n → ¬Sat(k, /s(x)0), 
(H*)  h(n, y) ↔ (y > n → ∀z (z > y → ¬Sat(<z, y>, /h(x, y)0))).  
 The key difference between the two paradoxes lies in the fact that Yablo’s paradox 
concerns sentences and the paradox described in this section concerns predicates, 
which is indeed the most relevant difference we find between the Liar paradox and 
Grelling’s paradox. 
                                                      
20 In general, Sat(x, y) is always true when y > x or y = x. This is due to the fact that, according to our def-
inition of the predicates in l, x satisfies y iff a conditional whose antecedent is ‘x > y’ is true. 
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3. A counterpart of Zwicker’s paradox 
In order to devise a Yabloesque counterpart of the Hypergame paradox, consider an 
arbitrary non-empty set W of well-founded games. Now we will create a series of new 
games G1, G2 ..., not contained in W, such that a contradiction follows from the speci-
fication of their rules. The games G1, G2 ... will be called G-games. We want to specify 
the rules of the G-games in such a way that it is completely clear that there is no vi-
cious circularity involved in a play of any of the G-games. 
 Game Gi is defined with the following rules. On the first move player I chooses ei-
ther a well-founded game Gj, j > i (if there is any such), or any game in W. The chosen 
game will be called the subgame. Then they play the subgame, player II acting as play-
er I in the subgame. The winner of the subgame will also be the winner of the game 
Gi. 
 The G-games are not circular in any plausible sense, since the rules of any Gi pre-
vent players from choosing either Gi itself or games which can make Gi itself to be 
chosen at a later move. Nonetheless it is possible to prove a contradiction. Let us see 
how. 
 We will call F the set of G-games which are well-founded. Suppose F is finite. Let i 
be the highest index of the games in F (when F is empty, take i = 0). By the choice of 
i, all Gj, j > i, are not well-founded. Fix any k > i and let us consider how the non-
well-founded game Gk could develop. Since for every j > k, Gj is not well-founded, on 
the first move of the game Gk player I has to choose a subgame in the set W. Since 
the subgame of Gk is well-founded, any play of the subgame will end in a finite time, 
so Gk is well-founded. But Gk was a non-well-founded game. This contradiction 
shows that F cannot be a finite set. Hence there is a sequence Gi1, Gi2 ... with i1 < i2 < 
... and all Gij ∈ F. When playing game Gi1, player I could choose Gi2 on the first move 
and then player II could choose Gi3 on the second move and so on. This shows that 
Gi1 is not well-founded, contradicting that Gi1 ∈ F. 
 We would like to point out that the paradox can be reproduced even if the set W is 
empty, making a slight modification in the definition of the G-games. In the case 
where W is not empty, imagine that we well order the G-games and the games in W, 
putting first the G-games and then the games in W. Then we could describe informal-
ly the G-games with the rule: search for well-founded games down the sequence, pick 
up one (the subgame) and play it, letting the other player begin the subgame. When W 
is empty, this interpretation would give us the following rules for Gi: I searches for a 
well-founded game Gj, j > i. If there is none, I loses. Otherwise I chooses one of 
them, say Gk, and II begins playing Gk. The winner of Gk will also be the winner of 
Gi. Considering the definition of all G-games at once, the rules of Gi can be described 
equivalently as follows: players I and II must alternatively choose well-founded games 
Gi1, Gi2 ... with i < i1 < i2 < ... The player that cannot choose any well-founded G-
game with a higher index than those previously chosen loses the game Gi. 
 If the G-games are defined in this way, a contradiction can be found modifying the 
proof given when W is not empty. Using the same notation introduced there, suppose 
that F is finite and i is the highest index of the members of F. Then all Gj, j > i, are 
not well-founded. Hence I loses on the first move of any play Gj, j > i, since it is im-
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possible to choose any well-founded game. This proves that games Gj, j > i, end on 
the first move and are well-founded after all. The contradiction implies that F is infi-
nite and a new contradiction follows exactly as in the case of non-empty W. This 
modified argument shows that only the definition of the G-games is responsible for 
the paradox, the games in W being irrelevant. 
4.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have introduced two paradoxes concerning the predicates of satisfac-
tion and game which are prima facie non-circular and are related to Grelling’s and 
Zwicker’s paradoxes in the same way as Yablo’s paradox is related to the Liar. We 
have not taken a stand here as to whether Yablo’s paradox is really a paradox of self-
reference or not, but any verdict we reach in this respect should also apply to the   
paradoxes described here. We have suggested that the possibility of casting a paradox 
into the Inclosure Schema is a relevant criterion for deciding whether it involves some 
form of circularity or not. However, more work needs to be done in order to       
characterize the notions of self-reference and circularity if we want to decide whether 
Yablo’s paradox (and related ones) are really paradoxes of self-reference. 
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